Russia just played in the World Cup after a 12-year absence. On the same (time)line, Russia published a new Corporate Governance Code in 2014 that should reflect the changes in Russian Corporate Governance. The paper critically analyses this new code in comparison to its predecessor and global best practices. Implications are given, if the future of corporate governance in Russia should be based on directives or standards.
Introduction
For a proper investigation of the legal corporate governance issues in Russia, understanding the previous corporate structure and legal rights of shareholders is essential (see Ikemoto and Iwasaki, 2004, 21 and Kostyuk et al., 2007) .
Although the Russian model of corporate governance has similar features both with Anglo-Saxon and Continental European models, it also differs from them, which makes it specific. The main stages of the development of corporate relations are described in order to follow the formation of the key features of CG in Russian Federation.
Table 1. Development of corporate relations in Russia
Stage (years) Characteristics 1991 Characteristics -1994 Start of privatization, formation of corporations as the primary basis of corporate relations. 1995 -1998 Formation of the national legislation and shift of emphasis in the regulatory framework from privatization to corporate laws.
-2004
Completion of legislation formation, redistribution of property transactions, violations of law, growth and real influence of the stock market on corporate relations. 2004 -present time Transition to state capitalism, intensification of the role of the state and its representatives in the corporate governance bodies, partial monopolization of the most profitable sectors in the national economy by state. Note: see as well Redkin 2003 , Yakovlev 2004 From the latest improvements having influence on Corporate Governance legislation in Russia, following documents can be highlighted: The key features of corporate governance in Russia include high concentration of ownership and leading role of majority shareholders in companies' management, with the state often being one of the largest shareholders. Inconsistency in the development of corporate governance in Russia, in terms of correspondence with a particular model, lies in the fact that practically the whole history of the Russian legal formation followed the German (Continental) model. Recent corporate practice and corporatization, however, have been actively developed in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
Institutional investors are more and more promoting a culture of corporate governance among Russian companies. They developed standards, valuation methodologies, tried (and are still trying) to explain to the management of Russian companies the need of corporate governance improvement and the penalties they face neglecting change (Экспертно-аналитический доклад, 2011).
How these changes and corporate governance concepts (out of the new Corporate Governance code) are implemented is one of the focal questions of this paper. In the following the development and features of the new 2014 Corporate Governance Code will be discussed. Section 3 deals with the specific corporate governance problems in Russia. In section 4 the new code will be compared with best practice in the European Union (EU). Implementations for Russia in terms of regulations from the code being directives or standards will be discussed in section 5. The OECD laid out years ago that these goals can be achieved by means of internal and external discipline. The 1999 OECD Principles are a set of basic principles designed to guide the functioning of CG in all the countries around the world. System of remuneration of directors, the executive bodies and other key management employees of the company (different approaches to remuneration) System of risk management and internal control.
The standards of the Code are still not obligatory for application, however, in contrast to the first Code, they are presented in such a manner that implies fulfillment of the standards by the companies or explanations of the reasons of non-implication (comply or explain). The system of remuneration of directors, executive bodies and other key management employees of the company is also revised in the new Code and a whole new chapter now. −
− Paying attention to details listed in the
The section on major corporate actions was increased by more detailed guidelines in each kind of action, paying a lot of attention to listing and delisting of shares and its redistribution. The position of Corporate Secretary acquires practical meaning and changes from the status of "accessories" of the companies' corporate governance system to the guarantor of the minority shareholders right.
The main problem of still insufficient quality of corporate governance in Russian companies, including those listed on Moscow Stock Exchange, is formal compliance with many of corporate governance code's provisions, that are of voluntary adoption character, and practical non-compliance or only partial compliance with the rules not directly prescribed by the law (Kozarzevski, 2007) .
Moreover, in case of some serious corporate conflicts or shareholders rights violation, some issuers and companies try to use even such sort of opportunities, which are for sure a violation of legislation. This can happen, for example, in case of imperfection of approaches to the interpretation of the rules in the current arbitration practice, lack of sanctions or technical issues, as it can make it difficult for regulating bodies and other shareholders to counteract violators (Kuznetsov and Kuznetsova, 2009, 453 ).
Specific Corporate Governance problems addressed in the 2014 code
The problems that are directly touched upon in the Code are
Disclosure
The main point of the problem is that shareholders of Russian companies do not have secured by legislation and the Code the possibility to receive quality materials for shareholders' meetings in the most convenient for shareholders form in comfortable for them time constraints. Many listed companies announce the date of the ledger closing on the date of its closure. The problem is of major importance especially for foreign shareholders, who are practically being prevented from execution of their right to vote on the general meetings at the level, allowing studying all the materials and making a reasonable decision. Companies often disclose information about forthcoming shareholders meeting strictly in accordance with mandatory requirements of current legislation, but these requirements are not sufficient for international investors (McGee, 2009).
Even the notice of 20 days before the meeting does not allow international investors to vote in absentia, having a reasonable position on every matter of the day's agenda, since they may have a long chain of depositories, each of whom also has its internal voting deadlines. The main reason for weak practical shareholder rights protection is compliance by firms with only minimal requirements of legislation on information disclosure.
Board of Directors (incl. Committees)
Second issue in Russia is that insider directors often do not have required knowledge while independent directors with field-specific experience play rather formal role. Although the institute of independent directors in Russia is actively developing, corresponding changes to legislation are lacking. Criteria of independence do not correspond with international and best Russian practices. Independent director's rights and instruments of effective influence on the strategy of the Board are limited, which influences the effectiveness of the board of directors. Evaluation of the work of independent directors does not take place in practice or has a formal character (Shevchuk A., 2013, 8) .
Currently, the role and place of the board of directors in the system of CG in Russia is being qualitatively redefined. Minority shareholders (portfolio investors) have also became more active in processes of votes consolidation for election of independent directors (Ivashkovskaya and Stepanova, 2011, 607 Not only the evaluation of the effectiveness of the work of independent directors is missing, but also qualitative evaluation of the Board's effectiveness on the whole, which hinders the board members in increasing the productiveness of their activities. Lack of majority shareholders' hunger for endowment of all members of the board of directors with instruments of influence on decision-making process limits effectiveness of the strategic managerial body.
Minority shareholders rights protection
When talking about minority shareholders rights protection by the Code, international investors concern following issues: − Equal rights for all shareholders − Additional means of shareholders' protection in controlled companies − Mandatory offer for shares redemption − Voting of shares, belonging to entities controlled by the issuer − Preemptive right
Speaking of equal rights for all shareholders, it should be noted that shareholders owning more than 25% of shares have unlimited access to information. However, minority shareholders should also have access to all information, including about subsidiaries and related parties. All shares of the same type should provide for the identical rights.
Main concerns of international investors, which could be solved by additional means of shareholders' protection in controlled companies, add up to a widespread of controlled entities' ownership structures. First of all for the reason that such structures are often associated with inequality of minority shareholders in comparison with major shareholders. Therefore, the Code should include provisions calling for controlled companies to provide for additional means of protection of minority shareholders' rights and interests.
One of the positive issues about the new Code is that it clearly urges companies to follow its principles and not just to comply with the formal requirements of the law, as well as to fill in the gaps in legislation focusing, in particular, on important transactions involving controlled companies (Paragraph 7.4 of the Code, page 104). According to the Code, the board of directors is to be a leading hand when deciding on validity and fairness of the transaction's price for minority shareholders.
Another positive issue concerns principles, related to delisting of shares. They require transparency for this action. According to the best case scenario, the buyer should send a voluntary buyout offer on fair conditions and should not allow a mandatory delisting (Serve et.al, 2012, 3) . The paragraph 7.1 of the Code includes another good recommendation: it prompts the boards to enlist the services of independent estimator for market price determination of the assets in case of big transition or transaction with related parties even when a legislative requirement for such an action is lacking.
In general the Code consists of a number of recommendations, capable of lessening old and serious concerns of investors. If its provisions will lead to visible practical changes, it will be a positive step on the way to restore investors' confidence.
Other issues
Apart From the table 5 we can see that the new 2014 Code of Corporate Governance does only comply with the basic provisions of the Green Paper. When it comes to some more advanced requirements, there is either no information about it in the Code. 
Implications for Russia -Directives vs Standards
The reactions to the new 2014 Code were positive. The new code has a lot of improvements against the Code of 2002. However many things still have to be included into the new code for to fulfill its ambition about Moscow being a new international center by the year 2020. To do so, the (code) principles of good governance should be underpinned by effective laws and regulations (see Litvack, 2013 and Kostyuk et al., 2007) . The question therefore is if directives or standards in laws and regulations are the way forward for Russia.
Directives are legal commands which differentiate wished from unwished behaviour in a simple and clear way. Standards, however, are general legal criteria which are unclear and fuzzy and therefore require judiciary decision making and classification (Kaplow, 1992) . In the most uncomplicated sense, directives and standards can be differentiated by the level of complexity. Directives are inherently simple, clear and based on a command-like system of "tell and do". An incomplete corporate governance report leading to a liability for the management is a directive whereas a norm for the management body to "disclose investor relevant data" without defining relevance is a standard. Such principles leave open what exactly the right level of disclosure is and how a violation of this standard is evaluated by a judge. A standard is therefore less straightforward in a basic sense of the word, only creating a point of reference.
There are systematic factors affecting the relative costs of directives and standards. A standard may have lower initial specification costs, but higher enforcement and compliance costs than a directive (Schaefer, 2001 ). For instance, promulgating the standard "to take responsibility for all stakeholders" is easy and does not generate any cost at all. However, applying this standard in practice would generate significant costs for both judges who have to determine whether the accused company has complied with the standard and for the defendants who have to determine the relevant stakeholders and the level of responsibility ex ante in order to escape liability. Directives, however, are more expensive to implement due to higher negotiation costs in the legislative process (because of active lobbying on behalf of different interest groups, for example). But clear rules have lower enforcement and compliance costs than standards. The table below illustrates the respective (dis)advantages of directives and standards. For countries with a long established corporate governance system, standards seem to be the accurate means to deal with issues. For Russia directives might be better against the background of their specific corporate governance problems such lack of investor protection, transparency and weak board of directors. Under these circumstances directives seem to be a better means to attract investors and guarantee good corporate governance.
Directives make a monitoring of companies (and judges) easier as directives give little scope for interpretation. The companies exactly know the rules and cannot claim ex post that they misunderstood. Standards, however, leave more questions open as far as interpretation, implementation and compliance within the judiciary system are concerned (Raja and Schaefer, 2004) .
Less than 20% of listed companies fully comply with provisions of the Russian Code of Corporate Governance 2002 with no explicit reporting obligation and no sufficient power of the Exchange to verify reported information (Shevchuk 2013, 25) . This cannot be found attractive by investors, therefore it is necessary for Russian listed companies to lift governance standards. Sunstein (1995) contends that because authorities have little room to interpret a rule, they are perhaps better in protecting individuals' rights. This idea can easily be transferred to shareholders' rights. If their rights are violated, these actions can be easily seen. Because decisions concerning standards are unique to each case, it would be more likely that decision makers are apt to abuse their power and act in a questionable way. Without strict guidelines, decisions can be tainted by personal preferences of the judge instead of concrete legal policies. In addition, if there is no list of strict directives, a standard may be too vague and difficult to monitor, thus encouraging corrupt behavior even more. For this reason, legal areas concerning corporate governance are particularly subject to possible corruption.
